The 
"prognostic" function (Snow and Benford 1988) , shaping ideas about what comprises legitimate, appropriate and effective responses to that group.
Yet scrutiny of the claims made in these debates highlights several problems with strategies of definition in which the underlying logic is of allocating a group to a category based on the extent to which it fits a set of pre-defined characteristics. First, movements and groups change over time, adopting more or less radical ideological positions and action repertoires (della Porta 1995; Tarrow 1997) . How do we ensure Second, categorizing groups as more or less radical or extreme can overlook important intra-group heterogeneity. Within any group or set of groups there are likely to be varied interpretations of their cause and collective identity, as well as diverse tactical tastes (Jasper 2007: 229-250; Blee and Creasap 2010; Blee 2012: 81-108 ). This can relate to different cliques or factions (della Porta and Tarrow 1986); to particular points in the protest cycle (Tarrow 1997; Koopmans 2003) ; or to different settings in which activism takes place. Activists may behave, emote and think quite differently depending on whether they are at a street demonstration, a private meeting, a social event or taking part in an online debate (Simi and Futrell 2010) .
One way scholars have sought to accommodate such heterogeneity has been through the idea that social action comprises a front-and back-stage (Goffman 1959) , with more public-facing action, such as manifestos, public speeches or media appearances, understood as a more coded front-stage, and internal communiques or private meetings interpreted as a back-stage, in which activists are less inclined to censor their comments or actions (Mudde 2000; Jackson 2011 ). This has provided a useful stimulus for researchers to look beyond the public-facing activities of such groups.
However, as Fennema and Maussen (2005: 117) observe, it runs the risk of a form of infinite evidential regress such that even where "extremist" aspects of the group have not been identified, one can always claim they are tucked away in a back-stage yet to be "discovered". Furthermore, fundamental ontological and epistemological problems arise if, as is often the case, the back-stage is imagined as a truer version of activists' beliefs, feelings and motives, since even during supposed back-stage interactions actors might still be subject to intense social pressures. How can we be confident that the more radical statements made by an activist during a private meeting comprise the falling away of their front-stage mask and not an act of bravado born of a desire for the admiration of their peers? Third, it is often difficult to identify where one group ends and another begins -a basic requirement if we are to develop arguments of the type "group X should be considered part of category C". This is particularly the case for groups with decentralized or network structures -increasingly the norm among social movements (della Porta and Diani 2006, 156-61) . Most movements encompass an array of groups and sub-groups, the boundaries between which become more or less demarcated over time, and who may act more or less independently of one another (Zald and McCarthy 1987) . The fact that within movements individuals often claim more than one group affiliation (Carrol and Ratner 1996) further complicates identification of group or sub-group boundaries. When Jo Bloggs disrupts a meeting by her local parliamentarian, is she acting as part of group A, part of group B or on her own initiative? As such, it is easy for actions to be attributed to a whole group or movement when they are in fact those of a distinct faction or individual.
Fourth, labelling debates that centre on establishing a group's location on a nominal mainstream-extreme axis can distort understanding of the relationship between radical groups and their social, political and historic contexts -a salient issue when fringe political groups appear increasingly able to gain traction within mainstream political arenas (Bail 2012; Minkenberg 2013) . Certainly, detailed empirical accounts of radical movements indicate that their ideological and cultural roots are often more intertwined with those of the cultural mainstream than is popularly supposed (Billig 1995; Tarrow 1997; Blee and Creasap 2010; Mudde 2010) . Conventional labelling debates can make it difficult to tease out these intersections because they privilege and embed clear categorical distinctions between the mainstream and nonmainstream; simultaneously concentrate analytical attention on difference between the "extreme" and the "mainstream" while inculcating a scholarly culture of seeking "to 'prove' the historical continuity and co-operation" (Mudde 1996 : 230) of movements identified as extreme or radical; and can erect emotional, reputational and political barriers to the scholarly consideration of similarity and interaction between mainstream actors and the supposed extreme (Blee 2007; Pilkington 2016: 13-36) .
Fifth, while standard strategies of description encourage the production of fairly fixed and stable categories, concepts such as extremism and radicalism are by definition relational -"[a]fter all, a non-violent public demonstration or rally can seem absolutely banal in Paris, but dangerously revolutionary in Pyongyang" (Gupta 2014, 140-1) . A failure to attend to the relational nature of radicalism and extremism leaves important questions hanging. How can we talk analytically about the radicalization of Our intention in this article is not to argue that the type of classificatory debates with which we are all familiar should not take place. They are an integral, even inevitable, part of the political process. Yet we would argue that standard strategies of definition are poorly suited either to capturing the essential "cultural messiness" (Harris 2009) of contentious politics -a point acknowledged by some of the scholars at the forefront of such definitional debates (Eatwell 2003; Bruter and Harrison 2011) -or to the description and analysis of the intersections between radical groups and the societal mainstream. As such, we propose an alternative strategy of description that, we argue, can improve our ability to respond to these challenges.
The approach we propose shifts the focus of analysis from the group per se to the patchwork of intersubjective contexts of belief and behavior across and through which contentious politics happens. We theorize this using the concept of micro moral worlds, adapted from Arthur Kleinman's discussions of "local moral worlds" (1992, 2006) . We illustrate this with reference to two groups that have prompted intense labelling debates: the English Defence League (EDL), part of the UK's antiminority protest scene, and Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), a prominent actor in antiGood Friday Agreement republicanism in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The EDL case study is informed by 16 months of ethnographic observation and more than three years of more general observation and analysis of EDL activism (Busher 2015 (Busher , 2017 , as well as other published studies of the group (e.g. Pilkington 2016 ). The RSF case study is informed by the analysis of RSF documents and statements, interviews with leadership and rank and file members (Morrison 2014) , and secondary sources (e.g.
Whiting 2012
). In what follows, we first introduce the case studies. We then discuss the theoretical underpinnings of our proposal and develop this with reference to the case studies before setting out what we consider to be the advantages of this strategy of description. While our discussion here relates specifically to groups many would consider radical or extreme, we believe this strategy of description could also be applied to groups or collective actors not on the radical fringe.
Two illustrative case studies
When the EDL emerged in 2009, in some ways it looked and felt like what would often be described as an extreme or far right group -angry-looking men, many with a background in football-related violence, shouting vitriol about Islam, Muslims and their prophet; their marches occasional spilling over into violence, including clashes with anti-fascists and ethnic-minority youths. Yet most EDL activists claimed to eschew racism, defining themselves as a "single-issue group" focused only on "Islamic extremism" and the "Islamification" of Britain; the group boasted members from ethnic minority groups, and during demonstrations it was common to find banners proclaiming "black and white unite against Islamic extremism", Israel flags and expressions of support for homosexuals -not symbols one associates with the extreme or far right (Copsey 2010; Busher 2015; Pilkington 2016) . Indeed, the EDL leadership criticized, and activists occasionally came to blows with, established far right groups including the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF).
The emergence of the EDL gave rise to extensive and still unresolved debates among academics, journalists, policymakers and anti-racist/fascist activists about how to define the group. Some described the EDL as a straightforward continuation of the extreme right or even fascism (Alessio and Meredith 2014; UAF 2015) . Others argued that while there were clear ideological and tactical continuities with the established far right, there were also important differences (Copsey 2010; Jackson 2011; Kassimeris and Jackson 2015) , while others still favored other descriptors, referring to the EDL as an "anti-Muslim/Islam protest" group or as a form of "antiIslamic populism" (Pupcenoks and McCabe 2013; Busher 2015; Pilkington 2016) . Academia is similarly divided. Some argue in favor of "dissident", albeit they distinguish between violent and non-violent dissident republicanism (Horgan and Morrison 2011) . Some however espouse alternative labels such as "republican ultras" (Tonge 2004) , while others argue that the "dissident" qualifier is too ambiguous and fails to reflect the heterogeneity of actors, their actions and beliefs (Whiting 2015) .
Societies as networks of local moral worlds
Our proposed strategy of description is conceptually rooted in Kleinman's discussion of local moral worlds, a term he uses to refer to the "particular" and "intersubjective" "contexts of belief and behavior" that are "constitutive of the lived flow of experience" (Kleinman 1992: 172) . They are the spaces of social interaction through which we live our lives develop our ideas, attitudes and feelings about ourselves and the world around us.
1 They are local in that they are particular to a set of individuals engaged in a specific series of social interactions. These might take place across a range of spatial or temporal scales: a particular workplace or family (Kleinman 1992 (Busher 2010) . What makes them local is that they emerge through a series of interactions, focused around a specific place or type of place, institution or set of institutions.
Local moral worlds are moral in the sense that human life is "inevitably moral"
because it entails the ongoing formation, assertion and negotiation of judgments about what is right or wrong, or has more or less value (Kleinman 2006: 1; Smith 2003) . These judgments are expressed and forged through action and interaction -whose hands we shake, who we doff our (metaphorical) caps to, when we applaud and when we remain silent, whether we encourage our children to study pharmacy or parapsychology, or when we allow ourselves to grin from ear to ear or suppress a smile -thereby generating emergent situated norms concerning what we should think and say, do and feel (Geertz 1973; Fine 2010; Hochschild 1979; Mische and White 1998) . Breeches of these emergent normative orders are likely to attract social sanction, while behavior that resonates with these emergent normative orders is likely to attract social rewards (Mead 1934; Goffman 1967; Fine 2010) .
From this perspective, societies constitute "a network of local worlds" (Fine 2010) , each with their own subtly different emergent normative orders, i.e. with their own "terms for propriety" (Fine 2010) , "ground rules for interaction" (Eliasoph 1999 ), "feeling rules" (Hochschild 1979 ) and "interpretive schemata" (Goffman 1974 ).
Meanwhile, most individuals can be conceived of as moving across multiple local moral worlds in the course of their everyday lives -that of the home, the workplace, the place of worship, their local sports club etc -and in doing so, reproducing, negotiating and sometimes transforming these local moral worlds.
Radical movements as networks of micro moral worlds
In the same way that societies can be conceived of as a network of local worlds, we conceive of collective actors engaged in contentious politics as constituting a network of micro moral worlds. for interaction, feeling rules and so forth. 3 The strategy of description that we propose is based on tracing, and comparing the contours of, the emergent normative orders to be found within this patchwork of micro moral worlds.
Primary micro moral worlds
We begin with what we call the primary micro moral worlds: the contexts of belief and behavior directly associated with the group e.g. marches that the group organizes, an online forum they manage and so forth. As we now illustrate, even with a fairly cursory account of these contexts of belief and behavior, we can begin to surface important differences in the emergent normative orders of these spaces.
In the case of the EDL (Figure 1 ), 4 some of the most prominent differences relate to the use or acceptance of violence and overtly racist language across these spaces.
Figure 1 about here
National demonstrations: These are formal events that attract participants from across the country, sometimes including supporters from cognate groups, and are undertaken in liaison with public authorities. At the EDL's peak, they attracted in excess of 2,000
participants, but at other times drew smaller crowds (circa 200-300). They tend to be heavily policed and attract substantial counter-demonstrations. Most are characterized by small-or medium-scale public disorder, and most activists acknowledge that the prospect of it "kicking-off" was at least initially an important draw for many who became activists (Pilkington 2016: 182-6 ). However, event organizers, stewards and many senior activists usually encourage compliance with police instructions and avoidance of confrontations, meaning there are few opportunities for legitimate or status-raising violence during these events. Most violence occurs either when activists come face-to-face with counter-protestors -when protagonists are able to claim their violence was provoked or in self-defense, or at the end of the demonstration when activists disperse, are less easily managed and many are intoxicated (Busher 2013) .
Violence is usually limited to throwing projectiles at and occasional fist-fights with opposing activists. Use of weapons is very rare. While overtly racist chanting is not uncommon, stewards usually seek to curtail such behavior, and the performance of taboo gestures, such as a Nazi salute, can result in ostracization or even assault by coactivists (Busher 2015 (Busher : 113, 2017 Pilkington 2016: 98) .
Local/regional demonstrations: These are also formal demonstrations undertaken in liaison with public authorities, but are organized by local groups and tend only to attract participants from the surrounding region. The smaller scale of these demonstrations means they are usually less heavily policed, attract smaller counterdemonstrations and have fewer public disorder incidents, although this may vary across the country. As such, the emotional mood is usually more relaxed than national demonstrations with fewer opportunities for what activists deem legitimate violence. These events are often described by organizers and participants as "family events", with violence or racist chanting heavily sanctioned by co-activists (Busher 2013) .
Flash demonstrations: These usually comprise no more than about 15 activists and are undertaken without liaison with public authorities, meaning there is more direct contact with the public and opponents. These events explicitly challenge and circumvent state authority. Occasionally, but not always, this has included the deployment of more serious violence than that generally seen on official demonstrations, e.g. grievous bodily harm (Busher 2015, 134; Pilkington 2016, 15) , without those involved facing significant sanction from their co-activists. Physical violence is very rare. These events are often attended by people outside or peripheral to the group, including activists' family and friends.
Street outreach (distribution of flyers and petitions):
Activists usually wear clothes bearing group insignia, unless deemed unsafe to do so e.g. in an area with a large Muslim population. Activists by and large show courtesy and openness towards the public: speaking clearly, putting forward their arguments using statistics, personal stories and recommending websites. They avoid chanting and build rapport through small acts of respectability, such as helping elderly people or people with limited mobility across roads. Overt racist language is usually strictly avoided.
Local membership meetings:
These usually take place in a pub or a member's house.
Meetings are informal, without minute-taking or formal motions, but provide a space for activists to share information and discuss new initiatives (Pilkington 2016: 43) .
Deference is afforded to more established activists, but everybody is given an opportunity to have their say. There are often discussions about how to reduce drunkenness and disorder on demonstrations. While overtly racist speech is more common here than in public-facing contexts, it may still be sanctioned through direct criticism or, more subtly, through scant positive emotional feedback from other activists (Busher 2017) . While not necessarily a popular position, within such spaces some activists have advocated forging alliances with established extreme right groups or with individuals (previously) associated with such groups.
Official online communications (official website, Twitter feeds and Facebook pages):
The EDL has made effective use of the Internet, especially social media, to build support (Jackson 2011) . While the material uploaded and distributed via these 
Unofficial online communications (personal social media accounts):
Here, local organizers are not able to remove posts, and activists are more likely to share material that strays from the main focal points of their protest narrative. Some activists post material that is overtly racist, e.g. in support of white supremacist groups in South Africa or the USA, although this sometimes results in challenge, hostility or even un-friending by co-activists. As such, behavioral norms here are considerably less consistent than in official online spaces, and sanctions less systematic.
Turning to the case of RSF (Figure 2 ), here some of the most prominent differences across their primary micro moral worlds relate to how activists construct and conceive of their relationship with paramilitary and non-dissident groups. 
Anti-austerity protests:
While the majority of analyses of Irish republican activity focus on their desire for a united Ireland, the organisations aim more specifically to achieve an independent and united socialist Ireland (Morrison, 2016) . This has led Unofficial online communications: Individual members also communicate using republican-specific discussion forums and through personal social media pages to promote their political beliefs, justify violence, and partake in organizational critiques when campaigns go wrong (Bowman-Grieve and Conway, 2012). Here, members are more likely to deviate from the party line than they are in the official online spaces.
For example, it is more common here to find claims about participation in paramilitary activities. However, the justification of violence and attachment of blame for attacks are usually carried out using a pseudonym.
Our argument is that by describing the micro moral worlds in and through which these groups operate we can start to develop a rich and highly granular picture of the emergent movement culture, surfacing subtle yet potentially significant differences in the terms for propriety, ground rules for interaction, feeling rules, self-image and so forth that constitute the lived experiences of activists in these groups. As discussed in the introduction however activists in any group typically engage with the activists and activities of other groups with overlapping interests. As such, it is also necessary to look beyond their primary micro moral worlds to what we call their adjacent micro moral worlds: the contexts of belief and behavior not associated directly with the group, but where at least some activists from the group either participate (e.g. events held by cognate groups), or to which they make frequent reference when developing arguments about their cause (e.g. publications or websites).
Adjacent micro moral worlds and incursions into other arenas
In the case of the EDL (Figure 3 
Figure 4 about here
Once adjacent micro moral worlds have been identified, we propose two analytical tasks (although space limitations mean we do not undertake these here). First, as with primary micro moral worlds, we can describe the emergent normative orders of these contexts of belief and behavior including, where possible, the role of activists from the group under analysis within these spaces (e.g. do they contribute overtly or covertly, are they largely criticized or praised, do they tend to abide by or challenge the local normative orders, are they prominent or background actors, etc.). Second, we can compare between the adjacent and primary micro moral worlds i.e. between the micro moral worlds over which the group has a greater or lesser degree of control.
This analysis of the adjacent micro moral worlds has two primary purposes. It ensures a fuller and more contextualized description of the contexts of belief and behavior in and through which the group operates. While one must recognize that other actors in these spaces might not sympathize or want to be associated with the group under analysis, such spaces are analytically relevant because they comprise possible "interlocks" (Fine 2010 ) between these groups and other publics. It also enables systematic to radio phone-in shows or incidents where members have managed, usually briefly, to state their positions from the audience of current affairs television shows. Here, the emergent normative orders are largely shaped by actors external, and often hostile, to the group. Of relevance to our analysis therefore would be issues such as the extent to which they comply with these emergent normative orders (e.g. do they abide by the rules of discussion set out by event moderators and enacted by other participants?),
and variation between how they position and present themselves in these spaces and the emergent normative orders characteristic of their primary micro moral worlds.
Discussion: The implications of a micro moral worlds approach
Describing groups as a patchwork of micro moral worlds does not preclude arriving eventually at claims of the type "group X fits best in category C". It does mean however that before such claims can be made other claims must first be made. These will be of the type "group X is directly associated with contexts characterized by behaviors P, Q and R and is less directly associated with contexts characterized by behaviors P, S and T", from which we might make inferences about the interpretive frames, emotion rules and normative orders characteristic of these contexts. 7 This can form the basis of comparison both between the contexts associated, more or less directly, with group X and between those associated with groups Y and Z, where groups Y and Z might be cognate groups, opposition groups or groups popularly considered mainstream, depending on the purpose of the analysis. Only then might such claims be used to develop more basic categorical claims about the group.
We propose three ways in which this descriptive focus on the patchwork of intersubjective contexts of belief and behavior can better render the cultural messiness of radical social movements and help generate a more detailed understanding of their cultural intersections with other groups. First, it both compels us to document variation in emergent normative order across these spaces, and enables us to theorize such variation without making conceptually and epistemologically problematic claims about which local normative orders comprise a 'truer' or more accurate representation of the group in question.
Second, the description of micro moral worlds provides a robust basis for systematic comparison across groups and over time. This is because: a) it requires a description of as full a range of micro moral worlds as possible; and b) it requires an explicitly situated description of activists' practices i.e. within the context of belief and behavior in which they take place. This reduces the likelihood that activists' practices in one context can be cherry-picked to support a particular general interpretation of the group. It also enables description of points of convergence or divergence in the practices of activists from different groups without implying overall cultural convergence or divergence between them. In addition, such comparison across the primary and adjacent micro moral worlds of the group in question and cognate or comparator groups ensures that the inherently relational nature of terms such as extreme, far and radical sits at the heart of the analytical process.
Third, underpinned by an acknowledgement that nominal groups operate across and through a range of contexts, over which they exert varying degrees of control, the micro moral worlds approach is better able than standard strategies of definition to accommodate the fuzziness of group or movement boundaries. Rather than providing a picture of a movement landscape characterized by abrupt group boundaries and formal or quasi-formal coalitions, it enables us to conceive of and describe points of overlap and interstitial spaces where actors from two or more groups contribute to the production of a micro moral world without having to suppose any formal or quasiformal collaboration between them, thereby helping to capture and convey the often ambivalent relations between cognate groups.
Conclusion
Standard labelling debates are an integral part of political contention (Benford and Snow 2000) , and are deeply embedded within media, political and academic cultures. how the range of micro moral worlds associated with a group affects their ability to accommodate a heterogeneous membership and shapes recruitment and desistance pathways; e) whether patterns of cultural con/divergence and participation across primary and adjacent micro moral worlds can be used to analyse or even predict emergent splits and alliances; and f) longitudinal analysis of cultural convergence and divergence between micro moral worlds associated with radical fringe groups and those associated with institutionalized or mainstream actors.
We conclude by pre-empting two possible criticisms. The first is that the application of this approach would be data heavy and resource intensive and, in the case of radical groups, that access to some of their micro moral worlds would be limited.
While this undoubtedly presents a challenge, it is not unique to this approach.
Furthermore, use of social media analysis and the proliferation of video footage available online is making it increasingly quick, easy, and relatively inexpensive to access many of the contexts of belief and behavior associated with these movements (see Collins 2008; Fisher 2015; Innes, Roberts, Preece and Rogers 2016) .
A second possible criticism of such a micro-oriented approach might be that it risks "missing the wood for the trees" (see for example Weinberg 1998) . We believe that this would miss the point that is being made. One of the characteristics of recent research on collective action and contentious politics has been a turning away from grand theory towards approaches that seek to get closer to human experience and ground analysis in an explicit theorization of human action and interaction (Harrington and Fine 2006; Jasper 2010 ). This is not about turning away from big social or analytical issues but recognizing that the explanatory power of the theories we use will always remain limited unless we embrace and interrogate rather than smoothing out the complexity of human action and the contexts in which it unfolds.
Exploring radical movements as a patchwork of micro moral worlds can provide a picture with considerably more depth and at higher resolution than that with which academics, policymakers and practitioners operate today. It also has the potential to create opportunities for important critical reflection on ontological categories that currently dominate, and we would argue sometimes stymie, thinking in this area.
